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Summary 
The paper tries to evaluate the optimal entry mode of a Multinational Company that is 
choosing among export, fragmented production structure with assembly-line FDI in 
LDC or complete production in LDC with FDI. The results show that if the plant 
installation cost is sufficiently high then the firm will find it profitable to export the 
finished product to the LDC market and the Government will not exercise any IPR 
restriction. If plant installation cost is below a certain critical level the MNC chooses 
complete LDC production with FDI over assembly-line FDI if the IPR restriction is 
strong, where the model assumes that a fake producer can copy the product if complete 
production takes place in LDC. In such a situation government will choose to protect 
IPR if government earning exceeds the cost of IPR protection, otherwise no monitoring 
is the optimal strategy of the government and MNC will choose the strategy of 
fragmented production structure and assembly-line FDI will take place in LDC. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between strong intellectual property rights protection, foreign direct investment 
and technology transfer is an issue of great interest. Protection of intellectual property rights is 
becoming a challenge to less-developed and developing countries like India. An interesting report 
on THE ECONOMIC TIMES shows how counterfeit and fake products have infested the Indian 
market. The report says that India tops the world counterfeit pharma products. Over 35% of the 
automotive parts sold in India are fake while the value of counterfeit and pirated software is over 
$ 1.5 billion. Such a glaring figure shows the importance of IPR restrictions in a developing 
economy like India.
1  
Empirical evidences showed that poor IPR protection rate would lead to low level of technology 
transfer. The study by Bascavusoglu & Zuniga (2001) examines how international differences in 
foreign patent protection affect decisions to transfer technology. The paper empirically evaluates 
the  role  of  intellectual  property  protection,  technology  endowments  and  market  size  on 
technology receipts of French firms from abroad. Results show that high technology sectors such 
as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing of machines and instruments, electronics, etc. are 
indeed  more sensitive to  IPR protection  overseas. On the  other  hand, IPR in  low-technology 
sectors have a negative effect, but are not significant. 
An empirical study by Wakasugi and Ito (2005) showed that for Japanese Multinational firms 
technology transfer measured by royalty payments of affiliate to parent firms is substantial in the 
countries where the enforcement of IPRs is strict, and that it increases in the countries where IPRs 
are strengthened.  Another  empirical study by Smarzynska Javorcik  (2004) sheds  light on the 
relationship  between  intellectual  property  right  protections  and  structure  of  foreign  direct 
investment using unique firm-level data set describing investment projects in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. First, the study indicates that investors in sectors relying heavily on 
protection of intellectual property are deterred by a weak IPR regime in a potential host country. 
There is also some evidence that weak IPR protection may discourage all investors, not just those 
in the sensitive sectors. Second, the lack of IPR protection deters investors from undertaking local 
production and encourages them to focus on distribution of imported products. Interestingly, this 
effect is present in all sectors, not only those relying heavily on IPR protection.  
Given  the  empirical  findings  Governments  all  over  the  world  tries  to  create  an  investment 
friendly  environments  hoping  that  multinational  corporations  will  bring  new  technologies, 
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management skills and marketing know-how
2. In the light of the above findings the present study 
theoretically explains the relationship between IPR restriction and structure of foreign investment. 
The study tries to find out different social welfare maximizing rate of IPR protection on the basis 
of which a foreign multinational firm is deciding whether to enter the LDC market via foreign 
direct investment or just export the product and secondly if enters via FDI it also considers the 
choice between assembly-line FDI which implies a fragmented production structure where the 
high  technology  intensive  production  procedure  is  undertaken  in  developed  IPR  protected 
economies and assembly-line activities are transferred  to less developed weak IPR protected 
economies 
3 and finally FDI with transfer of disembodied technology and complete production 
process.
4 
                                                 
2  A  ready  reference  of  the  change  in  attitude  is  evident  in  the  Indian  Pharmaceutical  Industry.  After 
independence  the  Indian  Patent  Act,  1970  was  enforced  to  ensure  rapid  industrialization  in  a  newly 
independent country as well as serve public interest in a balanced manner. The main feature of the Patent 
Act of 1970 was complete absence of product patent for pharmaceutical, food and chemical based products. 
The industrial sector was also covered by process patent. In order to integrate the country with the global 
pharmaceutical industry the Patent Act, 1970 has been amended in March, 2005. The new Patent Act 
introduces a product patent regime, covering drugs, foods and chemicals. This is in compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement of WTO designed to  bring an end to the copy  of drugs patented abroad by Indian 
pharma companies. This was allowed under the previous Act as long as the Indian companies used different 
manufacturing processes. Thus the Parliament of India approved the 3rd Patents (Amendment Bill), 2005 
expecting to encourage foreign investment in research and development projects consequently benefiting 
the Indian economy. As expected the FDI in the pharma industry is estimated to be $ 172 million during 
2005-06 recording a CAGR of 62.6% during the period 2002-06.In case of R&D, in 2005-06 the R&D 
expenditure of 50 major companies totaled $495.19 million growing at a rate of 26% over the previous 
year. This shift to a higher growth path is largely attributable to the new product patent act in 2005. 
Pharmaceutical Industry Analysis News by Bio Spectrum Asia:  http:// www.biospectrumasia.com 
 
3 A common example of this type of FDI is in the case of Coca Cola - one of world’s leading beverage 
suppliers. The MNC prepares the concentrate in the United States  which is then exported to different 
countries where the bottling units of the MNC are located either as complete subsidiary units or as joint 
ventures. 
 
4  In  this  respect  we  must  mention  the  Public  Notice  No.  60  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Commerce, 
Government of India in December 1997, to increase the technology intensive FDI in automobile sector of 
India. The policy placed import of capital goods and automotive components under open general license, 
but  restricted  import  of  cars  and  automotive  vehicles  in  Completely  Built  Unit  (CBU)  form  or  in 
Completely Knocked Down (CKD) or in Semi Knocked Down (SKD) condition. Car manufacturing units 
were issued licenses to import components in CKD or SKD form only on executing a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the Director General Foreign Trade (DGFT). 11 companies signed MOUs with 
DGFT under which they agreed to: 
1.  Establish actual production of cars and not merely assemble vehicles; 
2.  Bring in a minimum foreign equity of US $ 50 Million if a joint venture involved majority foreign 
equity ownership; 
3.  Indigenise components up to a minimum of 50% in the third and 70% in the fifth year or earlier 
from the date of clearance of the first lot of imports. Thereafter the MOU and import licensing will 
abate; 
4.  Neutralise  foreign  exchange  outgo  on  imports  (CIF)  by  export  of  cars,  auto  components  etc. 
(FOB). This obligation was to commence from the third year of start of production and to be   4 
A large number of theoretical papers have dealt with the matter of technology transfer and entry 
of  foreign  firms  in  the  LDC  market.
5  However  none  of  the  papers  considered  the  case  of 
multinational firms’ decision over assembly line FDI vis-à-vis transfer of complete technology 
and production in the LDC via FDI under different IPR regime.  
The paper on IPR and the mode of technology transfer by Viswasrao (1993) formulates a model 
where the lack of IPR protection in the Southern countries affect the nature of licensing contract 
offered  by  the  North  as  well  as  the  mode  of  technology  transfer.  The  choices  available  are 
examined in a partial equilibrium game theoretic setting where asymmetric information adversely 
affects licensing of low cost technologies to the South. The paper concludes that northern firm 
may  opt  for  subsidiary  production  or  monopoly  licensing  which  lowers  Southern  welfare. 
Nicholson (2000) in a theoretical paper considered the manner in which multinational enterprises 
facilitate technology transfer from the North to the South, and the role-played by the protection of 
intellectual property. Different industries respond to changes in intellectual property protection 
(IPP) regimes  differently, and alter their mode  of  entry accordingly. Firms  with complex but 
easily imitable products will tend to internalize production through foreign direct investment, but 
firms that face a lower risk of imitation will tend to license production to non-affiliated Southern 
firms. 
Paper by Zigic (1998) rejects the common belief that the South generally benefits from relaxing 
IPR  protection  while  the  North  is  worse  off  in  a  North-  South  duopoly  framework  with 
technological spill over. In this respect the congruence of interest with respect to Southern IPR 
                                                                                                                                            
fulfilled during the currency of the MOU. From the fourth year imports were to be regulated in 
relation to the exports made in the previous year. 
However this notice was abolished with effect from 01-04-2001. On December 21, 2001, the World 
Trade  Organisation's  dispute  settlement  body  (DSB)  arrived  at  a  decision  that  the  'indigenisation' 
condition, as  contained  in  Public  Notice  No.  60  and in  the  MoUs  entered  into  there  under, is  in 
violation of Article III:4 of GATT 1994 as at the date of its establishment. With the Panel having 
announced its decision, India would not be able to impose, in any manufacturing area, conditions of 
the kind specified in its December 1997 notification, so long as it remains a member of the WTO. 
Sources: 
a) Auto Policy, Government of India, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Department 
of Heavy Industry, New Delhi, March 2002. 
b)  Frontline,  Volume  19,Issue  1,  Jan05-18,  2002,  Published  by  The  Hindu, 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1901/19011030.htm 
 
5  According Maskus (1998) the increase in international investments in nineties and problem of protection 
of IPR in the same period has led to the inquisitiveness about the link between technology transfer and IPR 
protection. A number of papers (Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Muskus (2001)) used endogenous 
growth models to show that protecting IPR could benefit the South by increasing the flow of technology to 
the South. The papers also considered the role of IPR protection on rate of FDI and rate of innovation. 
 
     5 
protection regime should  not be an  exceptional or impossible state of affairs. Paper by Zigic 
(2000) analyzed the issue of optimal tariffs when the Northern and Southern firms compete in 
quantities  in  an  imperfectly  competitive  Northern  market  and  there  are  potentially  varying 
degrees of intellectual property rights (IPR) violation by the South. IPR violation is reflected 
through the leakage of technological knowledge (“spillovers”) from the Northern to the Southern 
firm creating unit cost reduction. It is shown that optimal tariffs in this framework are always 
higher than in the simple duopoly model. However this paper did not discuss the matter of foreign 
direct investment. 
Similarly  Again a paper by Mattoo, Olarreaga & Saggi (2003)  explores the preferences  of a 
foreign firm and a welfare maximizing host country government over two modes of FDI - direct 
entry or acquisition of existing domestic firms in the presence of costly technology transfer. The 
paper shows that a purely welfare maximizing government might use FDI restrictions in order to 
influence the foreign firms choice between different modes of entry. However this paper does not 
give insights about the intellectual property right protection and entry of foreign firm in the LDC 
market. 
The model developed by Eicher and Kang (2004), tried to integrate optimal entry modes as a 
function of market size, FDI,  fixed cost tariffs and transport costs. The results highlight that even 
in presence of high tariffs large countries are more likely to attract accusation investment while 
intermediate sized countries may be predominantly served by trade. In this case also the issue of 
IPR protection has not been analysed. 
The matter of IPR protection and FDI decision is analysed in the paper by Naghavi (2005) in a 
North South framework. The model endogenizes Southern IPR policy and the Northern firm’s 
decision on whether to serve the Southern market through exports to obstruct exposure of its 
technology or by engaging in FDI to avoid trade costs. Southern firm is assumed to be incapable 
of acquiring the production technology unless the Northern firm moves production to the South. 
In other words, the Northern firm acquires a monopoly position by producing at home. If the 
Northern firm chooses to move production to the South, the Southern firm can enter the market 
and  the  two  firms  compete  in  a  Cournot  duopoly  setting.  Furthermore,  the  Northern  firm  is 
capable of engaging in R&D aimed at innovating more cost-effective production technologies. 
Knowledge gained through R&D is however assumed to have a public good character and can be 
imitated at zero cost. The model results show that a strict IPR regime is optimal for Southern firm 
as it triggers technology transfer by inducing FDI in less R&D intensive industries and stimulates 
innovation by pushing multinationals to deter entry in high-technology sectors.   6 
In the present paper we try to analyze the optimal entry mode for multinationals where the choice 
for the MNC firm is from any of the following options: 
•  Conduct  the  entire  production  in  the  developed  IPR  protected  country  and  then  export  the 
finished product to the LDC 
• Fragment the production between DC and LDC and shift the assembly-line units to LDC 
• Implementing the entire production in the LDC 
Like Nagavi (2005) the model assumes that the imitator firm in LDC market is incapable of 
acquiring the production technology unless the Northern firm moves complete production to the 
LDC market. If the MNC chooses to move production to the LDC, the imitator firm can enter the 
market and the two firms compete in a duopoly setting where MNC acts as a Stackelberg leader. 
In other words the product imitation is not possible if the MNC adopts the export strategy or the 
fragmented production strategy and thereby invests in assembly-line units only. In this case also 
we have endogenised the choice of IPR protection rate by the LDC Government  and it appears as 
a monitoring authority extracting a penalty in case of IPR violations from the fake LDC firm. 
Lastly the welfare implications of the different modes of entry are examined.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  2  describes  the  basic  model  and  the 
assumptions. Section 3 gives the optimal strategy choice of the MNC. Section 4 describes the 
welfare maximizing choice of IPR protection rate by Government. Finally Section 5 gives the 
conclusion. 
2. Model 
The model considers a MNC located in the Developed Country (DC) with the following options 
for production: 
(1) It can produce entirely in the DC market and export the finished product to the LDC with a 
per unit positive shipment cost. 
(2) It can fragment the production process in two stages between the DC and the LDC. In the first 
stage, production of the core material takes place in the DC. 
In the second stage assembling of the core material takes place in the LDC. A common example 
of this type of production is in the case of Coca Cola - one of world’s leading beverage suppliers. 
The  MNC  prepares  the  concentrate  in  the  United  States,  which  is  then  exported  to  different 
countries where the bottling units are located. 
(3) It can undertake the entire production in the LDC by opening up the entire manufacturing and 
assembling unit with FDI. Here the Government is introduced as a monitoring authority to restrict 
technology leakage to other competing LDC firms. The model assumes that, in the third case,   7 
where the production of core materials is taking place in LDC market, leakage of technology can 
take place. 
This will in turn lead to entry of competitive domestic firm if the IPR protection regime is weak. 
The model considers the following functional forms. 
The DC firm is facing a linear demand function which is given as 
p a q − =                            1. 
where q = quantity demanded 
p = price of the final product 
a = market size parameter introduced as a positive constant 
Specification of ‘a’ is given in the following way: 
If a > 1 the LDC market is large. 
If 0 < a < 1 the LDC is not sufficiently large. 
Given this demand function we proceed with the production option for the DC firm under the 
three different production options. 
Case 1: Production Conducted Entirely in DC and product exported to LDC. 
First,  we  consider  the  situation  where  the  foreign  firm  is  undertaking  the  entire  production 
process in her own country. 
The Total Cost function of the DC firm is defined as follows: 
tq A cq cDC + + =                                          2. 
The model assumes that the production process is divided in two stages. In the first stage of 
production core material are produced by undertaking the sunk cost A. and in the second stage of 
production the assembling or finishing tasks are undertaken by incurring a per unit variable cost c 
and t be the per unit positive shipment cost for transferring the finished product from the DC to 
the LDC. 
The profit function of DC firm is defined as follows: 
A - tq - cq - q)q - (a           
A tq cq pq Export
=
− − − = π
                           3. 
From the First Order profit maximizing conditions we get the monopoly output, price and profit 
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Case 2: Fragmented Production Structure between DC and LDC 
Secondly the DC firm may choose the strategy of fragmenting the production between the DC 
and LDC. Thus it can conduct the manufacturing part in the DC, (thus bringing in embodied 
technology to the LDC) and complete the assembling part in the LDC. The Total Cost function of 
the DC firm is given by 
F tq A wq cFrag + + + =                                               5. 
Where w is the per unit cost of assembling the semi finished product in the LDC. It is assumed 
that  w  <  c  due  to  cheap  labor  in  the  LDC.  t  is  the  per  unit  shipment  cost  to  transfer  the 
intermediate product to the LDC. For simplicity it is assumed to be same as the shipment cost of 
the finished product and F is the initial plant installation cost to transfer the production partly to 
the LDC. A is the sunk cost of production undertaken in the DC to manufacture the core material. 
The profit function of the DC firm under fragmentation is given as 
F a tq wq   - q)q - (a          
F a tq wq pq Frag
− − − =
− − − − = π
                                                  6. 
From the first order profit maximizing conditions equilibrium quantity, price level and profit are 
given as follows: 
F A
4
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                                         7. 
The price output combinations are the monopoly combinations of the DC firm since 
the firm is the sole producer of the good in the LDC market. 
Case 3. Complete Production in the LDC 
The third alternative to the DC firm is to produce entirely in the LDC through FDI and undergo 
complete  technology  transfer.  That  is  in  this  case  the  DC  firm  is  bringing  in  disembodied 
technology to the LDC. The DC firm will act as a monopolist in the LDC until and unless a fake   9 
producer (producing with diffused technology from the DC firm) enters the market. Thus with the 
entry of the fake producer both the firms will operate as duopolists reaching a Sub Game Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) where incumbent DC firm acts as a leader and fake firm operates as 
follower. The impact of IPR restrictions is introduced in the form of a Government Sector acting 
as a monitoring authority trying to resist technology diffusion and entry of the fake producer. 
Extracting a penalty or lump sum punishment charge from the fake producer does this. 
Thus the game plan for the DC firm or the foreign investor is 
(1) Initiate production entirely in the LDC as a monopolist. 
(2) Technology diffuses to another LDC firm who enters the market by producing exact replica of 
the original product. Both the firms operate as quantity competitors in a leadership follower-ship  
(3) The Government enters and tries to detect the fake producer. The probability of detection of 
the fake producers is  ) 1 ( α − where    1 0 ≤ <α .
6 If detected the DC firm or the foreign investor 
continue acting as the monopolist otherwise he can at best be a Stackelberg leader with the fake 
producer acting as a follower. 
Assumptions 
Let α  be the probability of the entry of the fake producer. 
Let  A  be  the  sunk  cost  of  production  incurred  by  the  foreign  investor  and  F  be  the  plant 
installation cost of the foreign firm in the LDC. As assumed in the previous model w (this symbol 
is different) is per unit assembling cost of the semi-finished product in the LDC. Let G be the 
government punishment/penalty cost to be paid by the fake producer if detected. Let C be the cost 
of acquiring technology to be incurred by the fake producer. The fake producer does not have to 
incur the fixed cost F for plant installation. 
The expected profit of the incumbent DC firm is given by 
{ }
{ } F A q q wq ) q a ( q                   
F A ) wq ) q q a ( q ( ) wq q ) q a )(( 1 (
2 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 Incumbent
− − − − − =
− − − − − + − − − =
α
α α π
         8. 
Where q1 be the output of the incumbent DC firm and q2 be the output of the fake producer.  
The expected profit of the fake producer may be given as: 
[ ] C G ) 1 ( A wq q ) q q a ( 2 2 2 1 fake − − − − − − − = α α π                          9. 







                                                 
6  0 > α  implies that perfect monitoring is impossible as monitoring by the government is costly.   10 







=                                                                   10. 
This  is  the  reaction  function  of  the  fake  producer.  Given  the  reaction  function  of  the  fake 
producer the reduced form profit of the incumbent DC firm is defined in the following way: 
{ } F A 2 / ) w q a ( q wq ) q a ( q 1 1 1 1 1 Incumbent − − − − − − − = α π                
Maximising this with respect to q1 gives 
2
) w a (
q LDC 1
−
=                                                                                  11. 
From (10) the equilibrium output level of fake producer is given as 
4
) w a (
q LDC 2
−
=                                                                         12. 
Let pLDC  be the expected price under this situation
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The equilibrium profits of the incumbent and fake firm are given as: 
F A
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Thus the fake producer enters the market for  [ ] 1 , ˆ α α ∈
8 
Thus a high punishment level (G) or a high cost of copying technology C, or a high level of sunk 
cost of production deters the entry of fake producer. 
For  α α ˆ < the incumbent firm acts as a monopolist and earns his monopoly profit given as 
F A
4





= π        8b. 
 In the next section we try to find the optimal strategy choice by the DC firm under different IPR 
regime and different level of plant set up cost in LDC under foreign direct investment. 
                                                 
7 In this case when both incumbent and the fake producer operates in the market the price is given as 
(a+3w)/4 and if the fake producer does not enter the market the price is given as (a+w)/2. 
8 A high value of G will increase α ˆ , and that will reduce the profitability of fake production.    11 
 3. Optimal Strategy Choice of the MNC. 
As already mentioned the DC firm has three possible strategies: 
First it can choose the  export strategy where the production  is taking place in the  developed 
country. 
Second it can fragment the production process. In this case core materials are produced in the 
developed country only the finishing or the assembling part takes place in the LDC. 
Third it can produce the commodity entirely in the LDC. 
First we compare the profit of the DC firm under export and fragmented production process 
Proposition 1 
For certain values of plant installation cost (below the critical level given by F*) the incumbent 
firm prefers the fragmented production structure than the export strategy. Again larger market 
size  prefers  this  move  while  the  higher  transport  cost  discourages  such  effort,  where 
4
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It is assumed that 
4
) w c )( t 2 c w a 2 (
* F
− − − −
=                                      15 
F* be the critical level of cost of opening a production or assembly line unit in the less developed 
country. If actual value of F is above this level, from equation (14) it is clear that the foreign firm 
will choose the export strategy over the fragmentation strategy, only a low level of F will induce 
the fragmented production structure.     
Now let us analyze the impact of different parameters on the critical value of F. 










If the market size increases the critical value of F increases. This increases the range of values of 
cost  of  foreign  investor  to  set  up  a  plant  in  the  LDC  for  which  the  fragmented  production   12 
structure is profitable than the export strategy.  Thus a large market size encourages fragmented 
market structure.   










If  the  transport  cost  (cost  of  exporting  the  finished  product  to  the  LDC  or  transferring  the 
intermediate product to the LDC) increases, the critical value of F decreases. This implies that 
increase in transport cost reduces the fragmented profit at the higher rate than the profit under 
export strategy for higher  values  of plant setup cost, that is critical  value  of F decreases for 
increase in transport cost. Thus a higher transport cost discourages the fragmented production 
structure compared to export strategy. 
Next we compare the profit under fragmented and complete LDC strategy. 
Proposition 2 
The developed country firm chooses to produce completely in the LDC for the values of α in the 
interval  ( ) [ ] α α α ˆ *, max , 0 ∈ , otherwise chooses the strategy of fragmented production, where 
α ˆ
G 16 A 16 ) w a (
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) w a (








It has been shown that if the actual value of  α α ˆ < then incumbent firm operates as a monopolist 
in the market and gains a profit given by equation 8b. This profit always dominates the profit 
under fragmentation given by equation 7 as long as the transportation cost t is positive. Hence for 
α α ˆ < the firm always chooses the complete LDC strategy to fragmentation. 
Alternatively if  α α ˆ ≥ , the fake producer operates at the market along with the incumbent firm. 
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≤                  16 
Thus, if the fake producer actually operates in the LDC market (i.e. if α α ˆ ≥ ) then the incumbent 
DC firm chooses complete LDC strategy if  * α α ≤ .   13 
As already mentioned the DC firm always chooses the complete LDC strategy to fragmentation 
strategy for  α α ˆ < . 
So when  * ˆ α α < , the firm chooses complete LDC up to  * α α = , beyond which fragmented 
strategy  is  adopted.  Alternatively  if  * ˆ α α >   then  the  firm  chooses  complete  LDC  up  to 
α α ˆ = as in the interval  α α ˆ 0 ≤ <  it operates as a monopolist. Beyond α ˆ  again fragmentation 
will take place. 
 
The comparative static analysis with respect to market size ‘a’ and the transport cost gives the 
following result.   
1) 0
) w a (
















 which implies a higher market size encourages the fake producer to enter the 
market. 
So a higher market size discourages complete DC production. The logic is intuitive. Higher the 
market size, greater will be the profitability of production of incumbent firm as well as fake 
producer. So more stringent IPR restriction is required for transfer of disembodied technology 
otherwise FDI is channeled to assembly line sectors only. 
Again  0
) w a (










So if t increases  * α  decreases implying a higher transport cost favoring complete production in 
LDC with FDI. 
Next  we  compare  the  profit  under  export  strategy  and  complete  LDC  strategy  and  draw  the 
following results. 
Proposition 3 
1.  The firm will choose export strategy over complete LDC strategy if 
*
1 F F ≥ . 
2.  For 
*
1 F F <   the  incumbent  firm  chooses  complete  LDC  production  where 
[ ] ) , ˆ max( , 0
*
1 α α α ∈ , otherwise export strategy is chosen. 
Thus the firm chooses complete LDC if the monitoring is strong. 
Where  α ˆ
G 16 A 16 ) w a (
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=    14 
Proof: First we compare the export strategy profit of the monopolist to monopoly profit of the 
incumbent firm under complete LDC strategy when the fake producer is not entering the market. 
This is possible for   α α ˆ 0 < < . 
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+ ≤ ⇒                  17. 
For values of plant installation cost above 
*
1 F , export strategy is always adopted, as in this case 
even the monopoly profit under complete LDC strategy is less than that of export strategy. Next 
we compare the profits for these two strategies when the fake producer operates in the market 
along with incumbent firm. 
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This equation can be written as
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                       18. 
Thus  for  values  of  α less  than 
*
1 α the  incumbent  firm  chooses  complete  LDC  strategy  as 
compared to export strategy when fake producer operates in the market (i.e.  α α ˆ ≥  ). 
                                                 
9 ) w t c )( t w c a 2 ( − + − − −  can be written as 
2 2
2
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Where From 14 we have  
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From 15 we have  *
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1 ≤ α . In this case export strategy is chosen 
for all values ofα . Basically if   
*
1 F F ≥ , and   α α ˆ 0 < <  it is shown that monopoly LDC profit 
is strictly less than that of export strategy. For  α α ˆ ≥  when fake firm enters the market the 
duopoly profit of the incumbent firm will be higher than the profit under export strategy if and 
only if actual value of  α  is less than 
*
1 α . In this case if
*
1 F F ≥ then  0
*
1 ≤ α  and 
*
1 α α ≤  is 
impossible as  1 0 ≤ <α . Hence export strategy is always adopted. 
From 19 it is clear that  0
*
1 > α  if 
*
1 F F < . In that case if  α α ˆ
*
1 > then the complete LDC is 
chosen for  *] , 0 ( 1 α α ∈ . In this interval the firm will act as a monopolist for  α α ˆ 0 ≤ < , as it is 
not  profitable  for  the  fake  firm  to  enter  the  market  for  the  corresponding  values  of  α . The 
incumbent firm receives the duopoly profit in the interval
*
1 ˆ α α α ≤ < . Alternatively if  α α ˆ
*
1 <  
the  incumbent  firm  will  choose  complete  LDC  strategy  for ] ˆ , 0 ( α α ∈ .  The  incumbent  firm 
receives the monopoly profit in this entire range of α  values as the fake firm does not enter the 
market  for  α α ˆ < .  Combining  the  results  it  is  obtained  that  if 
*
1 F F <   the  complete  LDC 
strategy  is  chosen  in  the  interval [ ] ) , ˆ max( , 0
*
1 α α α ∈ ,  otherwise  export  strategy  is  chosen. 
(Hence Proved.) 
 
Thus combining the above three propositions the optimal strategy choice of the foreign firm can 
be given as follows: 
Proposition 4 
1.  For 
*
1 F F ≥ the foreign firm always chooses the export strategy. 
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− −
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2. 
*
1 F F * F < <   the  foreign  firm  chooses  the  complete  LDC  strategy 
for [ ] ) , ˆ max( , 0
*
1 α α α ∈ , otherwise export strategy is chosen. 
3.  For  * F F 0 ≤ ≤ the  foreign  firm  chooses  the  complete  LDC  strategy  if 
[ ] *) , ˆ max( , 0 α α α ∈ , otherwise fragmented strategy is adopted. 
The proof follows from the three other propositions. 
From  proposition  4  it  is  clear  that  if  the  cost  of  plant  installation  in  LDC  is  very  high 
(i.e.
*
1 F F > ) then the firm prefers to choose the export strategy rather than involving in any type 
of FDI in the LDC.  Alternatively the foreign firm will be involved in transferring disembodied 
technology  via  FDI  if  and  only  if  the  rate  of  IPR  protection  is  strong.  In  this  framework 
disembodied technology transfer will take place and firm will undertake the complete production 
in the LDC if and  only  if the rate of  monitoring  is strong and falling in the range  given by 
[ ] *) , min( , ˆ max( , 0
*
1 α α α α ∈ . Given the assumption that transfer of complete production process 
to LDC may lead to entry of fake producer supplying imitation product with diffused technology 
from the DC firm, the incumbent firm transfer complete production if and only if IPR protection 
rate is high. When IPR protection rate is low but the cost of plant installation in LDC is also low 
the  incumbent  firm  prefers  to  open  the  assembly  line  units  in  LDC  and  imports  embodied 
technology to the LDC. 
11 This fragmentation strategy is chosen if  ) ˆ *, max( α α α > and the plant 
installation charge  * F F ≤ .  
 4.Social Welfare Analysis 
The Social Welfare comparison of the different modes of production also gives important insights 
to the different modes of production chosen by the DC firm. The Social Welfare can be defined as 
the sum total of profit retained by the foreign firm in the LDC, consumer surplus and Government 
surplus less the cost of production, monitoring etc. 
The assumption made here is that under FDI, the DC firm fully repatriates profit thus leaving 
Social Welfare as the sum total of 
SW = Consumer Surplus + Government Surplus - Costs 
In case when production is conducted entirely in the DC, the Government Surplus and Costs are 
both zero. The model assumes that if the product is exported to LDC then the probability of 
product imitation does not exist. Hence Government does not incur any monitoring cost to protect 
IPR of exported product. So under export strategy the social welfare is defined as 
                                                 
11 The model assumed that import of embodied technology does not have any technology spillover effect.   17 
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=                          20. 
In case of fragmentation strategy the social welfare is defined as follows: 
8





=                                     21. 
Finally we consider the situation where the fake producer enters the market. The fake producer 
will profitably operate in the market if and only if  α α ˆ > .  
Then the ex ante level of social welfare is defined as follows: 
SWLDC= Expected profit of fake producer+ Expected net level of consumer surplus + Government 
Earnings.  
The expected profit of the fake producer is given by 9a as 
C G ) 1 ( A
16
) w a (
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The expected consumer surplus is as follows:
12 
32





=                                22. 
The net government surplus is defined as  
) ( d G ) 1 ( GS LDC α α − − =                                     23. 
Where  ) ( d α  is assumed to be the government monitoring cost such that  0 ) ( ' d < α  that is as 
the monitoring cost increases the probability of entry of the fake producer decreases and vice 
versa.  Again  0 ) ( " d > α ,  implying  that  the  monitoring  cost  increases  at  an  increasing  rate. 
Finally it is assumed that the complete monitoring is impossible implying that  
  ) ( d ∞ → α when  0 → α .  
 Thus social welfare under complete LDC strategy when the fake producer is operating in the 
market (i.e. α α ˆ > ) is defined as follows: 
) ( d C A
32







=                       24. 
                                                 
12 CSLDC= (Probability that fake producer gets detected) *(Consumer surplus when incumbent firm operates 
as  monopolist)+  (Probability  that  fake  producer  cannot  be  detected)*(Consumer  surplus  when  fake 
producer operates along with the incumbent firm.)= 2 2 ) w a (
8
1
) 1 ( ) w a (
32
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From 24 we have the following results: 
1.  0 ) ( ' d A
32








              24a. 
As  0 ) ( ' d < α  and  0 A
32




(this follows from the profitability condition of the fake 
producer.) 





< − = α
α
                    24b. 
Otherwise in the absence of fake producer  (i.e.  α α ˆ ≤ ) the social welfare is defined as follows: 
) ( d
8





=                                                                      25. 
Finally it can be shown that equation (24) dominates equation (25) around  α α ˆ = . 
Thus  the  social  welfare  function  under  complete  LDC  strategy  is  increasing  in  α and 
discontinuous at  α α ˆ = . 
Next we compare the level of social welfare for three possible strategies and get the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 5 
i)  For 
*
1 F F ≥ the  government  chooses  the  no  monitoring  strategy  and  foreign  firm  always 
chooses the export strategy. 
ii) For  * F F 0 ≤ ≤   
 when  * ˆ α α <   and  government  budget  is  balanced  or  at  surplus  the  government  chooses 
* opt α α = . In this case the complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the game and the fake firm operates in the market. 
Alternatively when  * ˆ α α ≥  government chooses  α α ˆ opt =  if  Frag ˆ LDC SW SW >
≤α α  at  α α ˆ =  
and complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game and foreign 
firm operates as a monopolist in the market, otherwise no monitoring is the optimal government 
strategy and fragmented strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. 
iii) 
*
1 F F * F < <   
when 
*
1 ˆ α α <   and  government  budget  is  balanced  or  at  surplus  the  government  chooses 
*
1 opt α α = . In this case the complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the game and the fake firm operates in the market.   19 
Alternatively when 
*
1 ˆ α α ≥  government chooses  α α ˆ opt =  if  Export ˆ LDC SW SW >
≤α α  at  α α ˆ =  
and complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game and foreign 
firm operates as a monopolist in the market, otherwise no monitoring is the optimal government 
strategy and export strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Proof: 
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      (From 15) 
The consumer surplus under fragmentation strategy is higher than that of export strategy, which is 
obvious as the price of the product under fragmentation strategy is lower than that of the export 
strategy.  
From proposition 4 it is clear that for 
*
1 F F ≥ the foreign firm always chooses the export strategy 
Thus in this range for plant installation cost the domestic Government does not incur any cost to 
Protect IPR and optimal value of α  is  1 opt = α . 
Secondly we compare the social welfare under complete LDC strategy and fragmented strategy. 
But  from  Proposition  4  it  is  clear  that  complete  LDC  strategy  is  chosen  only  if 
[ ] *) , ˆ max( , 0 α α α ∈ , otherwise fragmented strategy is chosen when 0<F<F*.  
For  α α ˆ ≤  the fake firm does not enter the market, so the difference between the Social welfare 
under Fragmented strategy and Complete LDC Strategy is obtained by comparing equations (21) 
and (25) as follows: 
= −
≤ Frag ˆ LDC SW SW
α α ) ( d
8
) t w a (
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                      26. 
The first part is always positive, but given the assumption that     ) ( d ∞ → α when  0 → α , the 
equation (26 ) will assume negative values for lower values of α  and as α  increases and cost of 
monitoring declines then (26) may assume a positive value.  
Given proposition 4, for 0<F<F*, if α α ˆ * < , the foreign firm chooses the complete LDC strategy 
in the interval  α α ˆ 0 ≤ < , and beyond this level fragmented production is chosen. Given that the 
Social Welfare under complete LDC strategy increases with α , the optimal value of α  is α ˆ , if    20 
Frag ˆ LDC SW SW ≥
≤α α  at  α α ˆ =  and Complete LDC Strategy constitutes the sub game perfect 
Nash equilibrium of the game. Otherwise if  Frag ˆ LDC SW SW <
≤α α  at  α α ˆ = , the optimal value 
of α is unity and fragmentation will be the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
13 
At  α α ˆ =  we have 
α α α α ˆ Frag ˆ LDC ) SW SW ( = ≤ −  
= ) ˆ ( d
8
) t w a (
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                                                     27. 
The first bracketed term is always positive. Higher the value of transport cost, higher will be the 
gain in consumer surplus from Complete LDC production. However for lower values of t, gain in 
consumer surplus may not be enough to cover the cost of IPR protection. In that situation the 
social  welfare  under  fragmentation  may  dominate  that  of  complete  LDC  production  and 
Government  chooses  1 = α   and  fragmentation  strategy  will  be  the  sub  game  perfect  Nash 
equilibrium of the game.  Hence assembly line FDI takes place. 
Alternatively if for 0<F<F*, and α α ˆ * ≥ , the foreign firm chooses the complete LDC strategy in 
the interval  * 0 α α ≤ < , and beyond this level fragmented production is chosen. Given that 
α α ˆ * ≥ ,  the  incumbent  firm  chooses  the  complete  LDC  production  strategy  and  acts  as  a 
monopolist in the interval  α α ˆ 0 ≤ < and acts as a duopolist in the interval  . * ˆ α α α ≤ <   
For  α α ˆ >   
Frag ˆ LDC SW SW −
>α α  
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=                                                   28. 
From (16) the above expression can be written as  
Frag ˆ LDC SW SW −
>α α ) ( d C A
32
) w a ( 7
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=                       28a. 
As we have mentioned  LDC SW  is increasing in α  and discontinues at  α α ˆ = . Given the strategy 
of the foreign  firm that it  chooses complete LDC strategy  only in the  interval  * 0 α α ≤ < , 
                                                 
13 It can be shown that  α α α α ˆ Frag ˆ LDC ) SW SW ( = ≤ − is ambiguous in sign even if we assume that the 
government budget is balanced.. For Proof see appendix A1.   21 
otherwise chooses fragmented strategy, the optimal strategy for government is to choose  * α α =  
if   Frag ˆ LDC SW SW ≥
>α α at  * α α = .  
Otherwise Government chooses  . 1 = α  
In this case it can be shown that 
α α ˆ LDC SW
> is higher than  Frag SW  at  * α α =  when government 
budget is balanced or have a surplus. 
14 
Thus when 0<F<F*, if α α ˆ * ≥ , the optimal strategy of the government  is to choose  * α α =  
when the government budget is balanced or have a surplus. Otherwise if cost of monitoring is 
very high such that  Frag ˆ LDC SW SW −
>α α <0 at  * α α = ,  the ‘no monitoring’ is chosen so that 
1 = α   and  ‘Fragmentation’  is  the  sub  game  perfect  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  game.  Thus  in 
situation of costly monitoring assembly line FDI may take place in LDC. 
Finally we consider the social welfare maximizing value of α  for 
*
1 F F * F < < . For this range 
of plant installation cost in the LDC market from proposition 4 it is clear that the foreign firm 
chooses complete LDC strategy if  [ ] ) , ˆ max( , 0
*
1 α α α ∈  otherwise export strategy is chosen. Like 
the earlier case there will be two cases. 
Firstly  we  consider  the  situation  where  α α ˆ
*
1 <   along  with
*
1 F F * F < < .  In  this  case  the 
complete LDC strategy chosen for  α α ˆ 0 < < . (As the imitator does not enter the market in this 
interval.). So the comparison of social welfare under export strategy and complete LDC Strategy 
gives the following result: 
= −
≤ ort exp ˆ LDC SW SW
α α ) ( d
8
) t c a (
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                                      29. 
Given the assumption that  ) t c w ( + < , the first bracketed term is always positive. However 
  ) ( d ∞ → α when  0 → α , so for lower  values  of  α the  difference  is always negative. Thus 
equation (29) is always ambiguous in sign. Given proposition 4 under this situation if  
ort exp ˆ LDC SW SW >
≤α α   for  α α ˆ = ,  the  government  chooses  α α ˆ opt =   and  complete  LDC 
strategy  will  be  the  sub  game  perfect  equilibrium  strategy.  Otherwise  1 opt = α   and  export 
strategy will be the sub game perfect equilibrium strategy. 
Next we consider the case where  α α ˆ
*
1 ≥ along with 
*
1 F F * F < < . Given that  α α ˆ
*
1 ≥ , the 
incumbent firm chooses the complete LDC production strategy and acts as a monopolist in the 
                                                 
14 For proof see appendix A2.   22 
interval  α α ˆ 0 ≤ < and acts as a duopolist in the interval  . ˆ
*
1 α α α ≤ < Given that social welfare 
under complete LDC strategy increases with α , the government will choose 
*
1 opt α α =  if  
. ort exp ˆ LDC SW SW >
>α α  at 
*
1 α α = , otherwise chooses  1 = α and export strategy will be the sub 
game perfect Nash equilibrium when 
*
1 F F * F < < . 
. ort exp ˆ LDC SW SW −
>α α  
8
) t c a (
) ( d C A
32
) 4 7 ( ) w a (
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                   30. 
In this case it can be shown that 
α α ˆ LDC SW
> is higher than  LDC SW  at 
*
1 α α =  when government 
budget is balanced or have a surplus. 
15 Thus when government budget is balanced or at surplus at 
*
1 α α =  existence of a fake producer along with foreign firm producing the entire product in the 
LDC becomes the welfare maximizing equilibrium situation.   
Proposition 5 signifies the possibility of two interesting situations. Firstly there may be situations 
where the foreign direct investment will flow only in the assembly line sectors i.e. the firms are 
taking  fragmented  production  strategies.  Weak  IPR  restrictions,  but  low  cost  of  foreign 
investment leads to a situation where multinationals may shift the assembly line activities in the 
LDCs. This situation will lead to transfer of embodied technology in the LDC, which does not 
lead to spill over of knowledge. Secondly Proposition 5 also shows that there may be situations 
where government is choosing an IPR protection rate that induces the entry of fake firm in the 
market when the multinational is transferring the entire production process in the LDC. In this 
situation disembodied technology is transmitted to less developed economies thus leading the 
situation of knowledge spill over. 
 5. Concluding Remarks 
Our model investigates how foreign firms decision to produce in the LDC market depend on the 
IPR protection rate, fixed costs of plant installation, market size and transport cost of transferring 
the finished product to the LDC. The impact of these parameters on the strategic entry decision of 
a MNC gives some interesting results. Summing up the results we find that the entry decision of 
the MNC will initially depend upon the plant installation cost of the firm in the LDC. If the plant 
installation cost is sufficiently high then the firm will find it more profitable to export the finished 
product to the LDC market. In such a case the Government will find it optimal to exercise no IPR 
restriction  in the  form  of  monitoring  mechanism as  assumed  in the  model. Now  if the plant 
                                                 
15 For proof see appendix A3.   23 
installation cost to start off production in the LDC is below the critical value defined in the model 
then the choice of entry will be restricted between fragmentation or complete LDC production. In 
this case decision will depend on the probability of entry of the fake producer i.e IPR restrictions 
enforced by the Government. In case of low probability of entry of the fake producer the foreign 
firm  will  undertake  complete  LDC  production.  From  the  Social  Welfare  consideration  the 
Government will in this case also find it optimal to impose some IPR restrictions. However the 
underlying assumption made here is that the Government has a balanced or a surplus budget. If he 
Government  runs  a  budget  deficit,  as  commonly  seen  in  a  LDC,  then  the  government  will 
undertake no IPR restriction and its monitoring cost will be zero. In case if the probability of 
entry of the fake producer is high that is Government imposes no or lenient IPR restriction then 
the  foreign  firm  will  choose  fragmented  production.  The  other  parameters  of  the  model  for 
instance  market  size  parameter,  and  transport  cost  favors  fragmented  or  Complete  LDC 
production over the other modes of production. 
The results enumerated briefly above find support from recent policy change undertaken in the 
Indian  Patent  Act.  Empirical  analysis  has  also  shown  that  Multinational  Companies  are  not 
willingly to transfer disembodied technology if they face the risk of product imitation in the LDC. 
Thus in presence of weak Intellectual Property Protection the optimal policy for the MNC will be 




Bascavusoglu,  Elif  Zuniga M.P.,  2000 . “Intellectual Property Rights, Technology And 
Disembodied Knowledge Transfers Cross Borders: An Empirical Application”  . 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/smye/abstracts/p502.pdf 
Eicher, Theo.  and Kang Jong Woo.,  2005 . “Trade,  FDI or Acquisition: Optimal entry 
Modes for Multinational”,  Journal of Development Economics, 77(1),  207-228. 
Helpman,  Elhanan.,  1993.  “Innovation,  Imitation,  and  Intellectual  Property  Rights.” 
Econometrica 61, 1247--1280. 
Javorcik,. Smarzynska B., 2004. “The Composition Of Foreign Direct Investment And 
Protection  Of  Intellectual  Property  Rights:  Evidence  From  Transition  Economies”,  European 
Economic Review 48 pp.39 – 62. 
Lai, Edwin L.-C., 1998. “International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the 
Rate of Product Innovation”,  Journal of Development Economics 55, 133--153.   24 
Maskus,  Keith  E.,  1998.  “The  Role  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  in  Encouraging 
Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Technology  Transfer”.  Duke  Journal  of  Comparative  and 
International Law 9, 109--161. 
Mattoo Aaditya , Olarreaga Marcelo.,  Kamal Saggi .,  1988.  “Mode of foreign entry, 
technology transfer, and FDI  policy”, Journal of Development Economics, 75,  95-111. 
Nahgavi A., 2005. “Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North South 
Technology Transfer”, FEEM Working Paper No. 18.05 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
Nicholson, Micheal.,  2000.  “Intellectual Property protection, internalization and 
technology transfer” ,  Discussion paper of Colorado University, working paper no. 00-11. 
Tirole, J., 1989. The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Viswasrao, Sharmila., 1993.  “IPR and Mode of Technology Transfer”, Journal of Development 
Economics 78,  474-493. 
Wakasugi, Ryuhei., and Banri Ito., 2005, “How Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights Affects the International Technology Transfer: Evidence from Japanese MNCs”, G-Sec 
working Paper No.1. June 2005. 
http://www.gsec.keio.ac.jp/wp/papers/wp1.pdf 
Yang,  Guifang.,  Maskus,  Keith.,  2000.  Intellectual  Property  Rights,  Licensing,  and 
Innovation in an Endogenous Product-Cycle Model. Journal of International Economics 53, 169--
178. 
Zigic, Kresimir., 1998,  Intellectual property Rights violations and spillovers in North- 
south trade, European Economic Review, 42, 1779-1799. 
Zigic, Kresimir., 2000,  Strategic trade policy, intellectual property rights 
protection and North-South trade,  Journal of Development Economics, 61,  27-60. 
Appendix A1 
First we consider the case where 0<F<F*,and  α α ˆ * < , 
At  α α ˆ =  
α α α α ˆ Frag ˆ LDC ) SW SW ( = ≤ −  
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In this case let us make the assumption that government budget is balanced or have a surplus, i.e. 
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Given the assumption that  α α ˆ * < , from proposition 2 it is clear that profit of the foreign firm is 
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Thus the sign of  α α α α ˆ Frag ˆ LDC ) SW SW ( = ≤ −  is ambiguous in nature. 
Appendix A2 
From 28a  
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Given that  α α ˆ * >  we have  
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Thus for  * α α =    26 
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This in turn implies that  C G *) 1 ( A *
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If we assume a balanced or surplus government budget then 
) ( d G ) 1 α α ≥ − (  
This in turn implies that  
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Frag ˆ LDC SW SW ≥
>α α at  * α α = . 
If the government budget faces a deficit then  Frag ˆ LDC SW SW −
>α α  at  * α α =  is ambiguous in 
sign.  
Appendix A 3 
. ort exp ˆ LDC SW SW −
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 From (18) at 
*
1 α  the above expression becomes  
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1 α α =  the fake producer is earning a positive profit as  α α ˆ
*
1 > . This implies that  
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This in turn implies that  
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If we assume a balanced or surplus government budget at  
*
1 α α =  then 




1 α α ≥ − (  
Hence we have    27 
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